Monday 24 July 2017
   
“I cannot prevent the French from being French.” - Charles de Gaulle
 
Politicizing terror: terrorism and the 2017 presidential race
By Jocelyn Evans, Gilles Ivaldi
25 July 2016 | General | 878 words
Since the Mohammed Mérah shootings in 2012, France’s politicians have mostly presented a united front against terror attacks. In contrast, political controversy has quickly erupted over the recent massacre in Nice on Bastille Day, no doubt to be fuelled further by the killing of a Catholic priest near Rouen.

By the morning of 15 July, opposition politicians had taken to traditional and social media to criticise the government’s security policy as failing to prevent the attack on the Promenade des Anglais. Christian Estrosi, former Mayor of Nice and a pro-Sarkozy Republican right-winger, is currently leading the offensive against the government. “Lies are fuelling the controversy”, he said. ”If the state stops lying, there will no longer be a controversy.” The Minister of the Interior, Bernard Cazeneuve, is suing a municipal police officer who has accused the Ministry of pressing her to falsify her report on the presence of national police officers during the Nice attack. Reports suggest, however, that the policewoman has been publicly supporting Estrosi and his successor in Nice’s city hall, Philippe Pradal.

The rapid politicisation of the Nice terror attack has a number of causes. The first reason is real and serious, and concerns the effectiveness of the French security services and of government policy. Debate had already begun in the weeks prior to Nice. The official Parliamentary investigation into the Bataclan attack and subsequent manhunt put forward a number of proposals to address failings in the French security and intelligence services, all of which were rejected by an embattled Minister of the Interior. His position that the mobilisation of heavily armed police and troops on the streets of French towns would reduce the terror threat, to be violently disproved on 14 July, was already proving ineffective in controlling social unrest connected with demonstrations and direct action against the El-Khomri employment bill.


Presidential race

The second reason, however, is more typically political. At the end of November, the Republicans will hold their presidential primary race to decide on their candidate for April 2017. The original frontrunner, Mayor of Bordeaux and moderate conservative Alain Juppé, has recently seen his lead eaten into by the hardline former incumbent, Nicolas Sarkozy. Although still the most popular candidate with the French electorate in general, some 14 points ahead of Sarkozy, a similar lead among the party faithful has dropped to 8 points in the space of a month.

Juppé’s uncharacteristically outspoken criticisms of a government policy failing to stop the Nice attack is difficult to frame as anything other than an appeal to the more authoritarian right of the party which is slipping away to Sarkozy. Ironically, Sarkozy criticised the tenor of Juppé’s comments for being too speculative, before himself drawing attention to failing security policy. As the moderate Juppé shows his teeth, so the normally robust Sarkozy draws attention to his understanding of the realities of his former presidential domain, and once again plays the emotional card, asserting that “France cannot let her children be murdered.”


Far-right threat

The Republicans are all too aware that, inevitably, the most likely political beneficiaries of the attack are Marine Le Pen and the FN – the final reason for a politicised response. The party benefited in the December regionals from heightened fears over security and immigration, winning more than 40% of the vote in its southern and north-eastern strongholds. As polls suggested, most of the FN electoral boost came from former Republican voters increasingly fearful of Islam and immigration.. As right-wing voters are increasingly leaning towards the FN’s strong immigration and security policies, national unity would leave the field to the far right, and political consensus with the left is simply not an option for the French conservatives.

Current national security concerns are embedded in broader European issues, most evidently the EU refugee crisis. Immediately after the Bataclan shootings, Marine Le Pen promptly forged a link between the current influx of refugees and Islamist terror attacks, which she will no doubt reiterate after the recent events in Germany. Together with terrorism, European management of immigration is likely to top the 2017 agenda in France, potentially giving a traditionally Europhobic FN a strong presidential boost.

Despite falling popularity ratings, down some 10 points from a peak of 30% approval in December 2015, Marine Le Pen nonetheless looks very well placed in vote intentions to reach the presidential run-off in 2017. In the remaining months leading up to the most important election in the French calendar, both sides of the political mainstream need to reduce this possibility by whatever means necessary. Neither camp can afford to let the FN steal a march in owning the security and immigration issues any more than it already does.

Both sides are in strategic gridlock, however. Whilst the left is showing greater unity, the government’s national security agenda risks alienating part of the PS electorate as well as the Communists and the Greens. On the right, Sarkozy’s failure to win the presidency in 2012 demonstrated the limits of his hardline strategy as a weapon to use against a mainstreaming FN.

On a political level, there is no optimal solution. On a social and human level, what should have once more constituted a barbaric attack, bringing a country together in collective grief and outrage, has thus inevitably become grist to the political mill.

Back


Welcome to '500Signatures', for analysis and commentary on French politics and elections

This blog is produced by Jocelyn Evans (University of Leeds) and Gilles Ivaldi (University of Nice)

 
PREVIOUS POSTS
- Politicizing terror: terrorism and the 2017 presidential race
Hollande’s calculation behind the French socialist presidential primary
Is the French 2017 presidential battle already over?
Estimating Marine Le Pen’s 2017 presidential vote share
Walking a fine line? Hollande and the French Left
All roads lead to Rome: French parties on the way to the 2017 presidentials
Ils ne passeront pas – the stemming of the FN tide in the regional run-offs
The FN on the threshold of regional government
Regional elections and the anti-Muslim backlash
Politics in a time of war?
A right-wing landslide but no far-right tsunami: the departmental election run-off
The Front national is not France’s first party
What to expect in next month’s French departmental elections
Departmentals 2015: the new French elections no-one seems to care about
Beta-testing social-liberalism 2.0
France’s new earthquake election? The FN in the European elections


57
posts have been published
since 10 January 2012

Show all posts
 
ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Jocelyn Evans [@JocelynAJEvans] is Professor of Politics at the University of Leeds

Gilles Ivaldi is a CNRS researcher in political science based at the University of Nice

 
BOOK
 
RECOMMENDED






 
CATEGORY
 
DATA

- Forecasting the FN vote in Second-Order elections (updated 12 May 2014)

- Forecasting the FN vote in Second-Order elections (Jan. 2014)

- Polling scores by polling type (CATI v CAWI) (updated 20 April 2012)

- Estimating Marine Le Pen's vote in the 2012 presidentials: an experiment (November 2011)

- Data for the 2011 expert forecast survey (in CSV file)

 

 


 
Last modified on Monday 25 April 2016
Copyright Gilles Ivaldi - @2012-2014